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The role of the state in the Japanese economy is often quoted in answer to this question: it is claimed that by promoting and coordinating research, investment and exports in particular key industries, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) has provided Japanese companies with a competitive advantage in world markets. It is hard for European and American competitors to offset this advantage, and the result is Japan's trade imbalances with the major industrial nations. This allusion to Japan as an economic enterprise ("Japan Inc.") under strict MITI management originated in the 1960s when the state played a significant role in all areas of the economy and at the same time double-figure GNP and export growth rates were achieved. Since then, this image * Eberhard-Karls-Universit.~t T0bingen, Germany.
has been redrawn many times over, even though the role of MITI has changed.
In the following, a different approach is presented as an alternative to this line of argument. The author examines whether Japan's trade policy after World War II was successful in steering Japan's trade flows in the desired direction. In order to do this, individual instruments of trade policy are presented and conclusions drawn regarding their influence on the balance of trade. It is demonstrated that trade policy cannot be regarded as an explanation for Japanese export success. MITI intervention in the country's trade flows is interpreted not as a successful export promotion strategy, but as a reaction to short or medium-term structural problems which, from this point of view, have no bearing on long-term trends in the balance of trade. Thus at the same time it is made clear that there is no long-term strategy behind Japanese trade policy, but that trade policy merely adapts to the changing economic and political environment.
The development of relevant parameters is summarised in Figure 1 which shows the various instruments of trade policy, balance of trade developments and the evolution of structural change. It should be noted that, as the industrial structure moves from light industry via heavy industry to the knowledgeintensive industries, the balance of trade shows a constant upward trend. As the balance of trade improves, the restrictiveness of trade policy intervention diminishes. In the following, the development of these three components is demonstrated in more detail and the relationships between the individual developments are made clear. Finally, conclusions will be drawn regarding the 
Trade Policy and Reconstruction
Japan's period of reconstruction following World War II was a time of unstable economic development, high rates of inflation and large balance of trade deficits. In the main, Japan's export industries, such as textiles (43% of total exports in 1950) ~ and ceramics, were to be found in the light industry sector. Large import requirements for agricultural goods and raw materials (80%-90% of all imports) and the excessively high dollar parity (360 u = 1 $) led to substantial balance of trade deficits (see Fig. 2 ). In the existing system of fixed exchange rates these deficits, combined with low levels of capital influx, would have led to international insolvency or devaluation in the long term. In order to avoid this, Japan tried to reduce its balance of trade deficit by means of an active trade policy. Source The question is, however, why the Japanese government chose industrial and trade policy as a means of redressing its balance of payments rather than a restrictive fiscal policy or devaluation of the Yen. In a period of unstable growth and high unemployment, fear of contractive effects can justify the decision not to implement a restrictive fiscal policy. The aim of securing cheap raw materials and technology imports can explain Japanese reluctance to devalue the Yen. Johnson cites MITI's belief in the "utmost priority of trade promotion" (tsusho daiichi shugi) 2 as a further argument for the Japanese tendency to prefer trade policy measures as a means of redressing international trade imbalances. This interpretation again appears reasonable since it was The main focus of trade policy measures lay on constructing import trade barriers and promoting exports. At the same time, investments in advanced technologies were to increase the competitiveness of domestic industries and so create a long-term basis for improving the balance of trade. Since modernising domestic industries depended on importing foreign technologies and raw materials, trade barriers were restricted to consumer goods?
State Trading and Foreign Exchange Control
Up to 1949, the Japanese tried to redress the balance of trade by operating a state-trading system. However, direct state import controls and export subsidies failed to have the desired effect (see Fig. 2 ). In 1949, therefore, a transition took place towards indirect import regulation by means of foreign exchange controls. On the basis of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949 (gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku boeki kanri ho), MITI controlled all foreign exchange movements and allocated foreign exchange quotas to individual categories of import goods within the framework of a foreign exchange budget scheme (gaika yosan seido). This meant that the total import level could be limited and the import structure influenced in favour of raw materials and technologies. An import deposit scheme (yu'nyu tanpokin seido) worked in similar fashion: when applying for the foreign exchange necessary for imports, various deposits were required according to the category of goods in question; low deposits were required for raw materials and investment goods, high deposits for consumer goods. 4 Since the control of foreign exchange movements gave MITI extensive influence on the level and structure of imports, customs duties remained relatively insignificant as a trade policy instrument. Fig. 3 shows the scant importance of customs duties measured as a share of total imports in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Export Promotion Through Fiscal Policy
While import policy was aimed at limiting outflows of foreign exchange, export policy was intended to increase the influx of foreign exchange. In 1949, costly export subsidies were abandoned and indirect instruments of fiscal policy were implemented as a means of promoting exports. Export companies were granted tax benefits on export profits and were provided with reduced-cost loans via the Export Bank of Japan (Export-Import Bank as from 1952) which was founded in 1950. Thus export companies' In addition to financial benefits for export companies, a significant role was played by measures for improving "export consciousness". To this end, the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) was founded in 1951 and placed, as a public institution, under direct MITI control. Its aim was to improve Japanese companies' awareness of export opportunities? It made Japanese products known abroad and gathered information on international sales markets. 7 A further body involved in export promotion was the Export Conference (yushutsu kaigi) which was founded in 1954 and whose members included inter alia the prime minister as well as leading representatives of MITI, the Ministry of Finance, the central bank and Japanese industry. The Conference served the "non-committal" exchange of ideas on possible export strategies; export targets were published twice yearly. The high rank of Conference members bears witness to the great importance accorded to exports at that time. 9
There were thus two main thrusts to trade policy in the reconstruction period. Firstly, the provision of information was aimed at reducing knowledge deficits and encouraging the export activities of Japanese companies. Measures concerning the conveyance of information offset market imperfections and are in keeping with the principles of a market economy. Influencing external trade by means of foreign exchange controls, on the other hand, has a strongly distorting effect on international factor allocation. Since the choice of imported goods is governed not by the market but by the state, the resulting import structure is inefficient. Furthermore, trade barriers can render domestic companies' adjustment processes superfluous and thus delay industrial development. In spite of highly restrictive government intervention, the aim of redressing the balance of trade had not been reached by the mid-1950s.
Trade Policy and High Growth
In the mid-1950s, Japanese economic growth accelerated. With real growth rates in double figures, Japan caught up with the leading industrialised nations. 9 Thanks to strong export expansion (real average 13.4%), the balance of trade improved continuously and a surplus was achieved for the first time in 1965. Thereafter, too, the trend continued its unbroken upward path (see Fig. 2 ). It was also in this period that the structural transition from light to heavy industry was made, a fact that was reflected in the country's export structure. The main emphasis shifted from textiles, ceramics and wood products to goods manufactured in the chemicals and heavy industries such as machines, chemical and metal products (see Fig. 4 ). 1~
The aim of Japan's trade policy was still to make good the balance of trade deficit, and a strategy of export promotion and import substitution was continued to this end. However, since the desired high economic and export growth rates could be expected to lead to increased imports of raw materials and technology, these imports were to be offset by import substitution in the field of consumer goods. 11 Japan's accession to the IMF as from 1952 and GAFF as from As the Ministry of Finance kept interest rates artificially low, there was excessive demand for capital. This gave MITI the opportunity to steer loans into the sectors it favoured (cf. C. Johnson, op. cit., p. 2oo ff.) 8 Founding JETRO was intended to counter so-called "blind trade", a term used to describe the fact that many companies produced goods without any detailed information about sales opportunities abroad. Furthermore, there were no agencies abroad which could provide information on changes in market conditions and support marketing activities (cf. C. Johnson, op. cit., p. 230). 
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1955 -which was considered a necessary condition for securing export markets -meant that existing trade restrictions had to be reducedJ 2 For this reason, it was announced in 1960 in the so-called Plan for Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalisation (boeki kawase jikuya keikaku taiko) that 80% of all import restrictions would be lifted by 1963. This meant that foreign exchange requirements for imports were no longer subject to MITI examination but were granted automatic approval. The selection of products subject to liberalisation was geared to their international competitiveness and so reflected the structural change taking place. Imports from industries whose exports were already established on the world markets were to be liberalised immediately or as soon as possible. Backward industries, on the other hand, were to be protected for as long as it took for them to become competitive in relation to foreign rivals. Application of the Liberalisation Plan -according to the Japanese government -led to the achievement of a liberalisation quota (liberalised imports/total imports) of 93% by 1964. t3
Customs Duty Instead of Volume Restrictions
When she acceded to Art. 8 of the IMF in 1964, Japan was compelled to introduce further liberalisation measures. Since this accession required the immediate abolition of all value quotas, Japan turned all its value quotas into volume quotas which were compatible with the IMF but not with GAI-I. The volume quotas which were not compatible with GAI-I were maintained and gradually reduced in line with the growing competitiveness of the relevant industries. The large degree to which volume quotas on industrial goods were removed led to volume policies ,z As a rule, free access to foreign markets, which is necessary for the promotion of exports, also demands that domestic markets are opened up on a quid pro quo basis. The reduction of import restrictions is hereby both directly and indirectly in the interests of the developing country: directly, because reducing import restrictions lowers import prices for raw materials, intermediate inputs and investment goods; indirectly, because by importing the international level of competition, positive impulses are given to the domestic economy (cf. V. T i m m e r m a n n : Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik, GSttingen 1982, p. 202). being concentrated on the agricultural market, a particularly sensitive area in Japan (see Fig. 5 ). TM By way of compensation for the volume quota reduction, however, the Plan for Trade and Foreign Exchange Liberalisation provided for the erection of customs barriers, since at that time customs duties for the protection of fledgling industries were compatible with the rules of GA'I-I-, the IMF and the OECDJ 5 Fig. 6 shows how customs duties compensated for quota reductions.
The increase in customs duties continued up to the start of customs duty reductions which resulted from the Kennedy Round (1964-1967; see Fig. 3 ). Only in the course of these negotiations was there a change in direction in Japan's customs duty policy. As the upward trend in the balance of trade continued and Japanese opinion regarding the competitiveness of domestic industries changed, hopes of enhanced export opportunities within a free trade system led to a swift reduction in customs duties after the Kennedy Round. 16 
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The export promotion policy of the early 1950s was also upheld in the 1960s. A turning point was marked by recognition of GAI-I-Article 16 (subsidies), by which Japan committed itself to removing tax-based export subsidies by 1964. Consequently, tax allowances were replaced by indirect tax benefits such as special provisions and special depreciations which were not covered by GAFF. The Export Conference and JETRO even made efforts to improve "export consciousness" during the rapid growth period. Furthermore, the Export Inspection Act of 1958 represented an attempt to use state controls to ensure the quality of Japanese export products and thus safeguard the international reputation of Japanese goods. 17
Implementation of Voluntary Export Restraints
In the late 1950s, a new element was added to Japanese trade policy. New industries were entering the export phase, triggering off an increasing number of trade conflicts with western industrial countries, and taking the heat out of these conflicts became a task for Japan's trade policy. The industries first affected were the textile and ceramics industries. Under the auspices of MITI, the first voluntary export restrictions (VERs) were negotiated with the USA and Canada for knitted gloves and porcelain as early as 1954. TM In 1957, VERs were established for cotton exports to the USA, with quotas being allocated via export cartels. The trade conflicts began in the light industries and spread to heavy industry in the late 1960s. In 1969, VERs were introduced for steel for the first time (see Fig. 7 ). 19
Trade policy in the late 1950s and the 1960s was thus characterised in the main by the transition from value to volume quotas and later to customs duties, as well as by the introduction of VERs to assuage trade conflicts. On the one hand, import barriers were dismantled and on the other hand voluntary export restraints were introduced. Customs duties have a less restrictive effect than volume limits as they influence only the price and not the volume of imports. Market mechanisms remain intact. Voluntary export restraints offered Japan the chance to avoid more restrictive trade barriers such as volume restrictions and trade wars. At the same time, exporters can cream off the higher prices which result from voluntary export restraints, while higher profits from higher prices in the case of customs duties and quotas usually remain in the importing country.
Trade Policy and Economic Maturity
Having caught up with the USA and Europe to a great extent in economic and technological terms, economic development in the 1970s entered the phase of maturity. Real GNP growth rates came into alignment with those of other industrial nations; the average real GNP growth rate between 1974 and 1994 was 2.72% (USA: 2.07%, FRG: 2.35%). As a sign of the process of reaching economic maturity, knowledge-intensive industries such as computers and semiconductors now too reached the export 
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phase. As exports were still growing faster than imports, Japan's balance of trade surpluses continued to increase; in 1986, the highest level to date was reached at 4.1% of GNP (see Fig. 2 ). As Japanese companies became increasingly competitive internationally, and the balance of trade surpluses rose, government influence on the economy also receded. The continuing rise in balance of trade surpluses, which was interrupted only by the two oil crises (see Fig. 2 ), led to considerable pressure from western industrial nations towards deregulation and a further reduction of trade barriers.
Reduction of Customs Duties and Quotas
For this reason it was the most important aim of trade policy to defuse political pressure from abroad by introducing measures to open up domestic markets. The reduction of import quotas seen in the 1960s was thus continued in the following decades. In the mid-1970s, volume restrictions in the computer and semiconductor industry were lifted? ~ The remaining volume restrictions which were not compatible with GAFF stemmed in the main from the agricultural sector, such that negotiations shifted increasingly towards agricultural goods (see Fig. 5 ). 2' One of the last significant volume restrictions -that on rice (import prohibition) -was partially lifted on conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994.
Quota reductions were accompanied by a continuous decrease in customs duties. Following the Kennedy Round, Japan had reached a level of customs duties which corresponded approximately to that of the USA and the EC. 22 Further reductions of tariffs -especially within GAI-I--were realised in the 1970s and 1980s. According to the Uruguay Round resolutions, the weighted average customs duty on industrial goods is to be lowered to 1.7% by 1999. Customs duties on agricultural products, however, are on a significantly higher level with a weighted average duty of 13.3%. 23
Informal Obstacles to Trade and Import Promotion
As the reduction of formal trade barriers progressed and the instruments of trade policy were greatly limited by GAI-F, Japan's trading partners focussed their criticism increasingly on informal obstacles to trade 2' such as customs clearance procedures, test and certification requirements and product standards. 23 In 1982, the Japanese government bowed down to international pressure and declared its willingness to negotiate. In accordance with the agreement on technical trade obstacles reached at the Tokyo Round (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) , a framework law was passed promising to reform the 17 individual laws on standardisation and authorisation procedures according to the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and internationalisation. 23 Japan's efforts to make its standardisation and certification system simpler and more transparent for foreign companies are reflected in the founding of an Office of Trade and Investment Ombudsman (OTO) in 1990 to which complaints may be addressed on this subject. 27
As Japan's balance of trade surpluses continued to increase despite the successive reduction of formal and informal trade obstacles, and since foreign pressure to open up domestic markets grew, the Japanese government began a series of campaigns in the mid-1980s to promote imports: tax benefits were granted for imports of industrial goods, Export-Import Bank loans for imports of industrial goods and Japan Development Bank loans for foreign direct investments were extended. In addition, public funds were allocated to inform foreign companies about export opportunities to Japan. The JETRO infrastructure was utilised for this purpose. 23 Mounting export success meant that export promotion became largely insignificant. Indirect promotion by means of special provisions and depreciation was discontinued in the early 1970s. The activities of JETRO and the Export-Import Bank shifted to imports. Under pressure from anti-dumping charges and punitive customs duties (e.g. on televisions, CD players/video recorders and semiconductors), export policy was restricted in the main to establishing VERs with North American and European trading partners (see Fig. 7 ). According to MITI, 7.7% of Japanese exports were subject to voluntary export restraints in 1989. 29
In Japan's phase of economic maturity, the formal and informal trade barriers which still existed were thus further reduced. Mediation in trade conflicts became the most important task of trade policy, with MITI often undertaking the administration of VERs. Japan's efforts to promote imports represent a new element of trade policy which, in analogy to export promotion, is only efficient if it deals with information conveyance and the availability of an import infrastructure.
Conclusions
The preceding analysis demonstrates the close association between balance of trade, trade policy and structural change. Structural change plays a substantial role in the development of the balance of trade. Japan, which at the end of World War II still had the industrial structure of a developing country, has completed its transformation into a modern industrial nation quickly and rigorously. Numerous new industries were constructed, and export industries became concentrated on knowledge-intensive branches with high levels of value added such as automobiles, electronics or data processing. Old export industries such as textiles or steel became increasingly insignificant (see Fig. 8 ).
It was shown that trade barriers were primarily erected to protect industries which were not yet fit 
